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INTRODUCTION 
The chapter of authoritarian rule may finally be ending 
in Burma’s1 complicated narrative.  The Burmese government 
has taken visible steps towards democratic reform.  Despite 
reports of military control and intimidation at the polls,2 the 
country transitioned to civilian rule in 20103 after fifty years 
of control by a military junta.  The government also released 
the country’s preeminent democratic leader and icon, Aung 
San Suu Kyi,4 who has been on house arrest sporadically 
since 1989.5  Rapid political reforms soon followed.6 
The ability to reconcile Burma’s political history and 
transition to a democracy will be a challenging one.  A 
successful transformation requires more than legal 
formalism; legal formalism cannot work without the 
development of a civil society.  However, legal formalism, as 
Suu Kyi has urged,7 ensures a rule of law that will allow 
Burmese citizens, including minority groups, to protect 
themselves from their government’s historical abuse of power.  
This Comment discusses how the expansion of legal rights for 
individuals and minorities is the direct way for Burma to 
secure a democratic future. 
 
 1. The official name is the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.  See 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYAN. (2008) (HeinOnline, 
current) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST.].  As a personal preference, I will use 
“Burma.”  See Should it be Burma or Myanmar?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7013943.stm (last updated Sept. 26, 2007, 12:21 PM).  
 2. See Myanmar Votes in Election Controlled by Military, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/asia/07myanmar.html?_r=0. 
 3. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Junta Members Go Civilian, N.Y. TIMES (May 
1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/world/asia/02myanmar.html. 
 4. Myanmar Dissident Calls for Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/world/asia/15myanmar.html.  See also 
Kathleen Hennessey & Danielle Ryan, Aung San Suu Kyi Receives 
Congressional Gold Medal, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/19/world/la-fg-suu-kyi-obama-20120920 
(reporting on the democratic leader’s recent acceptance of Congress’ highest 
honor). 
 5. The Nobel Peace Prize 1991: Aung San Suu Kyi, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-bio.html (last 
updated Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter NOBEL PRIZE]. 
 6. See Thomas Fuller, For a Changing Myanmar, the Real Tests Lie Ahead, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/world/asia/for-
a-changing-myanmar-the-real-challenges-lie-ahead.html. 
 7. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, In Quest of Democracy, in FREEDOM FROM FEAR 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 167, 168 (Michael Aris ed., 1991) (advocating 
“representative government, human rights and the rule of law”). 
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Part I provides a foundation to understand the recent 
changes: it summarizes Burma’s political development 
history, the Asian values theory, and the right-to-
development argument.  The historical section examines four 
periods: 1) precolonial and colonial Burma; 2) the attempt at 
democracy following independence; 3) the military-socialist 
takeover; and 4) the current period following the 1988 
democratic movements.  This background validates the 
significance of Burma’s recent reforms and emphasizes the 
challenges that Burma must tackle moving forward. 
The section then goes on to discuss the Asian values 
theory, which is based on a claimed existence of a pan-Asian 
emphasis of communitarianism8 over individualism that 
purportedly accounts for the differences between Western and 
Asian standards of governance.  The reevaluation of this 
cultural argument is particularly important to Burma 
because of the country’s infamous human rights record and 
its apparent desire to correct that. 
Another critical theory supported by many Asian nations 
is the right-to-development argument.  This is premised on 
the idea that economic development is a prerequisite to 
political development.  Any expansion of political liberties 
must be subordinate to economic growth.  Like the Asian 
values discourse, many states have also used this argument 
to defend their human rights abuses. 
Part II considers the merits and flaws of the Asian 
human rights discourse.  It is useful to retrace the praises 
and criticisms that confronted the development phases of 
Burma’s Asian neighbors, particularly the relationship 
between human rights and economic modernization.  This 
section unearths the Asian values debate, examining whether 
there is an Asian type of democracy.  It goes on to question 
whether the low development of political rights is excusable 
because, as the argument goes, the priority appropriately 
remains with economic development. 
 
 
 8. I believe that “communitarianism” is a term of art to provide a 
comparison with the more Western notion of individualism.  In this Comment’s 
context, communitarianism is generally the belief that the individual is 
subordinate to the community, often resulting in less individual rights, rights 
that a Western political thinker may believe to be more valuable.  Elements of 
communitarianism will be discussed throughout the Comment. 
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Part III applies the arguments discussed in Part II to 
Burma and assesses Burma’s potential to establish a 
democratic future and a safe haven for individual rights.  
While some economic principles will be addressed, this 
Comment’s overall scope is limited to the political and legal 
assessment of Burma’s future.  Accordingly, this section will 
also explore Suu Kyi’s influence on her people and her 
government. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Burma’s Political Development History 
Political scientist Lucian Pye once wrote that “[i]f Burma 
does not succeed in developing a modern economic, political, 
and social structure, it will be a failure of human effort, a 
matter of social and cultural variables, a case of 
organizational and ideological inadequacy.”9  So far, this 
appears to be the case.  For most of its existence, Burma has 
been limited to extreme forms of government—from absolute 
monarchy, to colonialism, to militarized socialism.  Suspicion 
of those in power is the norm in Burmese society.10  
Historically, this has led people to trust only close 
associations like tribes and clans.11  Any reliance on broader 
government and political institutions, if any that exists 
currently, is a recent development in Burma. 
1. Precolonial and Colonial Burma: Approximately 
1075–1948 
Before Burma was made a British province in 1824,12 the 
Burmese lived under an absolute monarchy where the king 
ruled with unchecked power.13  Even the royal council lived in 
 
 9. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, The Cultural Dimensions of 
Authority 100 (1985). 
 10. See Stephen McCarthy, The Political Theory of Tyranny in Singapore 
and Burma 196 (2006). 
 11. Id. at 127.  Pye also notes that “[i]n Southeast Asia the politics of 
entourages and cliques, of personal networks and associations, are critical for 
the building of coherent national power structures.”  Pye, supra note 9, at 127. 
 12. U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, East & Southeast Asia: Burma, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bm.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2012). 
 13. See Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards 
Towards the Past, 1 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 5, 6 (2000) (writing that 
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fear of being thrown into jail for displeasing the king.14  The 
source of the king’s power arose from Buddhist beliefs, which 
provided limitations and taught kings to maintain order and 
justice.15  Legally, however, there were no controls on the 
king’s power and such religious limitations were often 
ignored.16  During this time, the administration of justice was 
“marked by a high degree of personalized behaviour, with 
little procedure other than prevailing notions of status and 
etiquette.”17 
The British introduced the Burmese to the rule of law.18  
During the monarchy period, law and custom had little 
distinction.19  The British imported foundational legal 
principles such as contract, property, trusts, sale of goods, the 
penal code, and criminal procedure.20  The British also 
established a court system, yet the courts worked mainly to 
the advantage of colonial administrators.21  There was a 
mixed reaction to the British rule of law.  To some, the system 
instilled new confidence in the government by providing 
equality and uniformity.22  To others, the prevalence of form 
and technicality produced a system that worked without 
sympathy and soul.23 
2. A Brief Experiment with Democracy: 1948–1962 
After achieving independence, the Burmese established a 
multiparty, parliamentary democracy,24 marking Burma’s 
greatest period of judicial independence and protection for 
individual rights.25  Provincial elections established a 111-
member assembly that drafted Burma’s first constitution in 
 
“governance of Burmese King was generally autocratic”). 
 14. See PYE, supra note 9, at 98. 
 15. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 140. 
 16. See Zan, supra note 13, at 5. 
 17. ROBERT H. TAYLOR, THE STATE IN BURMA 53 (1987). 
 18. MYINT ZAN, Law and Legal Culture, and Constitutions and 
Constitutionalism in Burma, in EAST ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS, NATION-BUILDING, 
TRADE 180, 196 (Alice Tay ed., 1993).  
 19. Id. at 190. 
 20. Id. at 200. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 197. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 123–24. 
 25. See Zan, supra note 13, at 16. 
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1947.26  While there was considerable British influence,27 the 
1947 Constitution also adopted the French and American 
notions of an elected president, a bicameral parliament, 
fundamental rights, and the principle of popular 
sovereignty.28  At the same time, the constitution was also 
founded on a type of democratic socialism where “people 
work[ed] together to the best of their power and ability to 
strive to convert the natural resources and produce of the 
land, both above and below ground, into consumer 
commodities to which everybody would be entitled according 
to his need.”29 
The Burmese Supreme Court was able to exert influence 
during this period.  In addition to having the authority to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto, and certiorari,30 the court issued notable decisions, 
indicating a wide degree of protection for citizens.  For 
example, the court held that the distribution of communist 
party propaganda leaflets did not constitute the basis of 
preventive detention.31  The court also invalidated rubber-
stamping detention orders and limited the delegation of 
preventive detention to certain officers.32  Even the executive 
branch came under scrutiny when the court struck down a 
number of executive actions and declared a particular 
presidential action to be ultra vires (“beyond the powers”).33 
3. Military-Run, Postcolonial Period: 1962–1988 
By the late 1950s, Burma spiraled into political 
mismanagement.34  Power was too centralized and minority-
dominated states became resistant to the central 
government.35  The government perceived such resistance a 
 
 26. ZAN, supra note 18, at 201. 
 27. See Zan, supra note 13, at 10. 
 28. ZAN, supra note 18, at 203. 
 29. Id. at 203–04.  For example, constitutional provisions qualified private 
property ownership “within limits which conformed to the public interest and 
which prohibited monopolies and price dictation.”  Id. at 205. 
 30. Id. at 216. 
 31. Zan, supra note 13, at 13. 
 32. Id. at 14–15. 
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. See David C. Williams, Constitutionalism before Constitutions: Burma’s 
Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (2009). 
 35. See id. at 1665 (“[E]very major ethnic group would field a significant 
resistance force.”). 
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serious risk to national unity.36  The 1947 Constitution 
provided any Burmese state the right to secession,37 and 
though no state actually exercised its right, a military coup 
nonetheless responded to the perceived threat and replaced 
the government in 1962.38  This marked the end to democracy 
in Burma for at least the next fifty years. 
From 1962 to 2010, a military junta ruled Burma in a 
one-party, socialist system.  The Burma Socialist Programme 
Party (BSSP), adopting socialist elements from the Soviet 
Union,39 dissolved parliament and established the 
Revolutionary Council under its control.40  Lasting until 
1988,41 the “People’s Judicial System” replaced all previous 
professional judges.42  The new judges were all appointed by 
BSSP and ninety percent of them had no legal 
qualifications.43  Though never formally abolished, the 
practice of issuing writs ended with the dissolution of the 
Supreme Court and the High Court of Burma, which had 
served as the guardian of the 1947 Constitution.44 
The new constitution of 1974 was an effort to be “more in 
harmony with Burma.”45  Through this new constitution, a 
monolithic power structure emerged.46  Single-party elections, 
in which voters either checked for or against a single BSSP 
candidate,47 created the People’s Assembly, the country’s 
highest legal authority.48  From among its ranks, the People’s 
Assembly elected lower coordinate councils, the president, the 
 
 36. ZAN, supra note 18, at 219 (“General Ne Win claimed that ‘if we [the 
Army] did not intervene [in March 1962], the country, if it did not split into 
many parts, would certainly have split into two.’ ” ). 
 37. CONST. OF THE UNION OF BURMA, ch. 10, § 201 (HeinOnline, current) 
[hereinafter 1947 CONST.] (“[E]very state shall have the right to secede from the 
Union in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.”). 
 38. ZAN, supra note 18, at 218–19. 
 39. Id. at 217. 
 40. Id. at 219–20 (Revolutionary Council as the law-making body). 
 41. Id. at 234. 
 42. Id. at 232. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 227. 
 45. Id. at 236.  David Steinberg noted that the 1974 Constitution drew 
heavily from Eastern European legal models (i.e., constitutions of Poland, East 
Germany, and Romania).  Id. at 240.  Williams wrote that the constitution 
resembled the Yugoslavian constitution.  Williams, supra note 34, at 1665. 
 46. ZAN, supra note 18, at 239. 
 47. Id. at 238 (“Virtually all of the single representatives to the unicameral 
Pyithu Hluttaw were elected on the first ballot.”). 
 48. Id. at 239. 
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prime minister, and the judges.49 
Though the coup occurred with no initial resistance,50 the 
new government soon faced opposition and responded to it in 
a brutal fashion for decades to come.51  As early as two 
months after the takeover, the army fired bullets at students 
who protested the new government’s assumption of power 
and policies against student activism.52  Thousands of arrests 
and “protective custodies” (detention without charge and 
trial) followed during the ensuing period.53  The absence of 
individual protection and recurring government brutality 
became the norm. 
4. Impetus for Change, Stalemate, and Renewed Hope: 
1988–2011 
In 1988, a wave of unprecedented protests swept Burma, 
reacting to twenty-six years of military tyranny.54  In the 
same year, Suu Kyi founded the National League for 
Democracy (NLD).55  In 1989, Suu Kyi was put on house 
arrest56 following her participation in the antigovernment 
protests and her frequent and outright criticism of the 
military leadership.57  In response to these demonstrations, 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),58 
replacing the BSSP, nullified the 1974 Constitution and 
promised to hold a multiparty election in 1990.59 
The election resulted in an overwhelming loss by SLORC 
to the NLD.60  The parties competed for 492 seats based on 
geographical distribution in the election;61 however, the 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 220. 
 51. See generally John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: 
Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 
102 (2009). 
 52. ZAN, supra note 18, at 220. 
 53. Id. at 228. 
 54. Id. at 251. 
 55. Id. at 255. 
 56. Id. at 256. 
 57. See NOBEL PRIZE, supra note 5. 
 58. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 103. 
 59. ZAN, supra note 18, at 254. 
 60. See id. at 257 (Seventy-three percent of the eligible voted; twenty-five 
percent of the ballots were declared to be “invalid” or “informal ballots;” the 
NLD grabbed sixty percent of the votes while twenty-five percent had voted for 
the NUP).  The NUP, the National Unity Party, was formerly BSSP.  Id. at 254. 
 61. Id. at 256. 
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winners were not immediately put in power.  SLORC refused 
to grant the NLD their new legislative seats until after a new 
SLORC-approved constitution was drafted.62 
Reformers soon realized that the SLORC-imposed 
constituent assembly was a means for SLORC to retain 
control.  Drafters were unable to speak or discuss freely.63  As 
a result, many pro-democratic members walked out.64  Many 
members were also arrested for disobeying SLORC policies.65  
Because the government continued to restrict open dialogue, 
the NLD boycotted and members were expelled from follow-
up constitutional conventions in 1995 and in 2004.66 
In 2008, a new constitution was drafted and approved.67  
The State Peace and Development Council (SLORC was 
renamed in 1997)68 handpicked the drafters who 
constitutionalized a military presence in the government.69  
That May, a year after the government’s bloody suppression 
of a Buddhist-led movement,70 a majority referendum 
approved the draft,71 and the new constitution went into 
effect in 2010 with the civilian transition.72  Reports of 
coercion and military intimidation, coupled with the disorder 
that resulted from Cyclone Nargis, indicated that the 
referendum was largely a sham.73 
And then, without a stir, the government implemented 
top-down, democratic reforms in the fall of 2011.  In 
September, public pressure prompted President Thein Sein to 
 
 62. Id. at 257. 
 63. Williams, supra note 34, at 1666. 
 64. Id. 
 65. ZAN, supra note 18, at 257 (adding that 181 out of 392 elected 
representatives had either been disqualified, forced to resign, died, detained, or 
were in exile). 
 66. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 137–38. 
 67. Williams, supra note 34, at 1669. 
 68. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104. 
 69. Williams, supra note 34, at 1669–70.  See infra Part III.A. 
 70. Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104. 
 71. See id. (noting that the referendum experienced premarked ballot 
papers, threats of physical violence, forced voting, and a low voter turnout and 
that such allegations of corruption was “widespread”).  “Despite reports of low 
voter turnout, the government eventually announced that 98.12 percent of 
eligible voters had voted, with the SPDC’s new constitution receiving an 
overwhelming 92.48 percent of the vote.”  Id. 
 72. See Mydans, supra note 3. 
 73. See Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104; Williams, supra note 34, at 
1669. 
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suspend a controversial dam partnership with China, 
reasoning that the project was against “the aspirations and 
wishes of the people.”74  In October, the government began 
freeing political prisoners amid long-time pressure from its 
foreign critics.75  The government abolished the practice of 
direct media censorship,76 and legalized trade unions and the 
right to strike.77  New and pending reforms continue to 
attract attention,78 including the eventual dissolution of the 
press censorship office,79 and the release of more political 
prisoners.80  In December, the NLD re-registered as an official 
party, and Suu Kyi has since announced her candidacy for a 
parliamentary position.81  In a by-election in April 2012, the 
NLD won forty-three of the forty-five contested parliamentary 
seats, including a victory seat for Suu Kyi.82  She has since 
been appointed to lead the “Rule of Law and Tranquility 
Committee,” which is responsible for establishing a legal 
 
 74. Thomas Fuller, Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/ 
myanmar-suspends-construction-of-controversial-dam.html?_r=1. 
 75. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Begins to Release Some of its Political 
Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/ 
world/asia/myanmar-begins-releasing-some-political-prisoners.html. 
 76. Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Government Abolishes Direct Media 
Censorship, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012, 1:14 AM), http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/08/20/myanmarcensorshipidINL4E8JK35920120820. 
 77. Joseph Allchin, New Law Gives Burmese Right to Strike, DEMOCRATIC 
VOICE OF BURMA (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.dvb.no/news/new-law-gives-
burmese-right-to-strike/18174. 
 78. See Jason Szep, Emboldened by Obama, Myanmar Maps Out Reforms, 
REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2011, 8:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
11/19/us-myanmar-reformsidUSL3E7MJ05Q20111119. 
 79. Myanmar’s Censor Calls for Press Freedom, UPI.COM (Oct. 11, 2011, 
6:10 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/11/Myanmars-censor-
calls-for-press-freedom/UPI-89641318327800/ (reporting that the director of the 
Press Scrutiny and Registration Department foresees that his department may 
soon be disbanded as his country trends towards democracy). 
 80. Dean Nelson, Hillary Clinton Burma Visit Raises Hopes Political 
Prisoners will be Released, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Dec. 2, 2011, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8931107/Hilla
ry-Clinton-Burma-visit-raises-hopes-political-prisoners-will-be-released.html. 
 81. Aung San Suu Kyi Party Unveils Logo in Burma Politics Run, THE 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8950472/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-party-unveils-logo 
-in-Myanmar-politics-run.html. 
 82. Peter Popham, Aung San Suu Kui Will Join Burma Parliament and 
Hopes to Reform Constitution, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/30/aung-san-suu-kyi-will-join-
burma-parliament-and-hopes-to-reform-constitution.html. 
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culture as the country continues to transition.83 
The reforms have garnered positive international 
attention for Burma.  The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) approved Burma’s bid for the 2014 
chairmanship.84  Burma held bilateral discussions with 
India,85 Japan,86 and Indonesia87 in order to rekindle economic 
and political support.  Most radically, U.S. Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton met with Burmese leaders, including Suu Kyi, 
to praise and assess the reforms; however, Secretary Clinton 
stressed that more than a “rhetorical commitment to reform” 
was necessary before lifting sanctions.88  Britain soon followed 
with a similar meeting, encouraging the country to continue 
democratic reforms.89   
Many observers, however, have remained hesitant to 
validate the sudden reforms.90  Intrastate violence between 
 
 83. Associated Press, Myanmar’s Suu Kyi to Chair Parliamentary 
Committee, AP (Aug. 7, 2012, 5:18 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/myanmars-
suu-kyi-chair-parliamentary-committee. 
 84. Asean Leaders Approve Burma Chairmanship Bid, BBC NEWS 
ASIA(Nov. 17, 2011, 7:16 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15771531. 
 85. Chandrahas Choudhury, Can India Push Burma on the Road to 
Liberty?, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-06-27/can-india-push-burma-on-the-road-to-liberty-.html. 
 86. The Mainichi, Japan Vows to Help Myanmar's Transition Toward 
Democracy, BURMA RIVERS NETWORK (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.burmariversnetwork.org/news/11-news/729-japan-vows-to-help 
myanmars-transition-toward-democracy.html. 
 87. Agence France-Presse, Indonesian Foreign Minister Meets Suu Kyi in 
Myanmar, GOOGLE (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.google.com/ 
hostednews/afp/article/AleqM5iupK1UgON9uUkyFHvRQkBL5wPACQ?docId=C
NG.55799cfbd389f865660da24bb02616c9.411. 
 88. Interview by Kim Ghattas with Hilary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of 
State, in Rangoon, Burma (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/ 12/178110.htm.  As this Comment goes 
to press, the Obama Administration has significantly lifted all of the economic 
sanctions against Burma.  See Sam Holmes & Celine Fernandez, Myanmar 
Awaits Sanction-Lift Effect, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2012, 12:04 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044454920457802219312083375
4.html.  See also Matthew Pennington, US Lifts Myanmar International 
Lending Restriction, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:42 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121010/us-us-myanmar-sanctions/ 
(writing that President Obama has lifted the U.S. restriction against Burma’s 
ability to lend from international financial institutions like the World Bank). 
 89. Jason Burke & Julian Borger, Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for Change as 
Hague Makes Historic Visit to Burma, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/aung-san-suu-kyi-hague-burma. 
 90. See Kelly McParland, Burmese Generals Put on a Show of Democracy for 
Audience of Skeptics, NAT’L POST (Canada) (Oct. 11, 2011, 11:45 AM), 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/10/11/burmese-generals-put-on-a-
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resistance groups and the national army is still a major 
issue.91  In June 2012, communal violence between Buddhist 
Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims prompted President Thein 
Sein to announce the expulsion of the Rohingyas from Burma 
as the only solution to the ethnic conflict.92  Even if the 
government is given the benefit of the doubt, how does Burma 
go about achieving a lasting democracy? 
B. The Asian Human Rights Conundrum 
In Asia, the contest between a state’s desire to maintain 
stability and the citizens’ demand for greater individual 
rights is a well-established issue.93  Governments, 
particularly those of China, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia, have argued that human rights policies, including 
political and civil liberties, are a matter of national 
sovereignty and should not be subject to international 
standards.94  Developing states have a legitimate concern 
when it comes to stability.  It would be hypocritical and 
unproductive, however, to legitimize repeated violence and 
suppression against dissidents in the name of stability.  As a 
result, human rights advocates believe that such intolerant 
governments invoke the argument only to maintain tight 
control over its people. 
 
 
show-of-democracy-for-audience-of-skeptics/. 
 91. Saw Yan Naing, And Now the Ethnic Crisis, THE IRRAWADDY (Thai.) 
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22297. 
 92. See ‘Campaign of Violence’ in Burma State-Rights Group, BBC NEWS 
ASIA (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19074383.  
See also Burma Blocks Opening of Office for Islamic Body OIC, BBC NEWS 
ASIA (Oct. 15, 2012, 8:47 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19949414 
(reporting on the government’s disallowance of an Islamic organization to 
establish an office in Burma to assist local Muslims in the aftermath of the 
Rakhine-Rohingya conflict).  But see Myanmar President Urges Change of 
Attitude Toward Muslim Minority, THE NATION (Thai.) (Oct. 22, 2012, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Myanmar-president-urges-
change-of-attitude-toward--30192795.html.  The two preceding articles 
represent the stark reality of minorities living in Burma and perhaps, the 
beginning glimpses of a government thinking twice about its past as it tries to 
move its country forward. 
 93. See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1994). 
 94. Id. at 7–8. 
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1. Asian Values 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
famously posed the Asian values theory.  The theory states 
that Western emphasis on individual rights has no place in 
the Asian heritage.95  Claiming Confucian principles and 
speaking on behalf of East Asian societies,96 Lee believes that 
the Western expansion of individual rights is bad policy:97 
“The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or 
misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly 
society.”98  Lee explained that “guns, drugs, violent crime, 
vagrancy, [and] unbecoming behavior in public” are sources of 
the American erosion of a well-ordered society.99  Without a 
well-ordered society, no one can achieve maximum freedom.100  
“This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a 
natural state of contention and anarchy.”101 
Lee compared the drug policies of the United States and 
Singapore to underscore the difference.  In the United States, 
the government sends antinarcotic forces across the globe to 
combat the source of the drugs.102  Instead, Lee directly 
resolved the problem with a national law that gives an officer 
 
 95. See generally Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 109 
(1994). 
 96. See id. at 113.  See also Ghai, supra note 93, at 11–12 (noting a strong 
Confucian element in a 1991 Singaporean white paper stating, “The concept of 
government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right for the 
people, and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than 
the Western idea that a government should be given as limited powers as 
possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven 
otherwise.”).  This is at clear odds with the American judicial standard of review 
of particular governmental actions as “immediately suspect” subject to the 
“most rigid scrutiny.”  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 97. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 111. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The legal ramifications arising from certain individual behavior in 
Singapore and the United States are indeed different.  Compare You Can Cage 
the Singer, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/17419873 (discussing how a Singaporean judge found a British journalist 
“guilty of scandalizing the judiciary”), with Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 
1220 (2011) (“As a nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”). 
 102. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 111.  See also Henry Chu, U.S., China Agree 
to Anti-Drug Pact / Cooperation Pledge Signed by McCaffrey During Beijing 
Visit, SFGATE.COM (June 20, 2000, 4:00 AM), http://articles.sfgate.com/2000-06-
20/news/17651842_1_so-called-golden-triangle-countries-joint-ties-crime-rings-
dealing-drugs. 
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the discretion to search and test anyone the officer believes to 
be under the influence of drugs.103  “In America if you did that 
it would be an invasion of the individual’s rights and you 
would be sued.”104 
Lee also believes that moral decay is another result of 
this sort of lawlessness: “Man needs a certain moral sense of 
right and wrong.”105  Because individuals are allowed to do 
whatever they want, “Westerners have abandoned an ethical 
basis for society . . . .”106  In comparing the views between Lee 
and Suu Kyi, Professor Myint Zan stated that: 
[Suu Kyi] may not entirely disagree with Lee that, in 
many countries of the West and especially the United 
States “individualism” has in certain aspects become too 
rampant and disturbing from the perspective of Asian 
societies and that the assertion of rights of the society 
with the attendant instillation of moral responsibility are 
needed to redress this.107 
Duties to the community are paramount in Asia, Lee 
further noted.  Lee admonished the West for improperly 
assuming the responsibility to remedy social ills.108  In Asia, 
the individual “is not pristine and separate.  The family is 
part of the extended family, and then friends and the wider 
society.  The ruler or the government does not try to provide 
for a person what the family best provides.”109  At first blush, 
Lee’s statement is seemingly odd because the Singaporean 
government is in fact very imposing.110  However, the notion 
of individual duty may iron out this apparent conflict.  Lee 
would argue that, unlike what is happening in the West, 
individual duty provides support to the community, 
 
 103. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112. 
 104. Id.  While there is greater protection of individual rights in the United 
States, those rights certainly are not absolute.  See United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (validating a search without a warrant when it is a 
“search incident to lawful arrest”). 
 105. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Myint Zan, Position of Power and Notions of Empowerment: Comparing 
the Views of Lee Kuan Yew and Aung San Suu Kyi on Human Rights and 
Democratic Governance, 2 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 49, 56 (1997). 
 108. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 113–14. 
 109. Id. at 113. 
 110. Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic 
Values, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 189, 190 (1994) (describing Lee’s regulation of 
individual action as “an Orwellian extreme of social engineering”). 
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preventing social problems and precluding the need for the 
state to intervene.111 
2. The Bangkok Declaration 
Notwithstanding criticism, Asian nations112 convened and 
signed the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights113 in 1993 
(hereinafter “Bangkok Declaration”), an attempt to validate 
the cultural relativity of human rights.114  Forty Asian 
nations115 agreed to memorialize the assertion that although 
human rights are universal in nature, the policy of human 
rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm setting, bearing in 
mind the significance of national and regional particularities 
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”116 
The Bangkok Declaration stressed other notable features 
that mirrored the defensive tone of the Asian values 
discourse.  The delegates agreed to respect “national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in 
internal affairs of the States.”117  The delegates also 
recognized the right to development as a fundamental part of 
human rights, while discouraging the use of “human rights as 
a conditionality for extending development assistance.”118  
Nor should human rights be used “as an instrument of 
political pressure.”119  The delegates also agreed that the 
principle of self-determination is limited to those under alien, 
colonial, or foreign occupation, and is not extended to 
“undermine the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, 
 
 111. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 113 (describing the differences between 
the West’s and Singapore’s response in dealing with single-parent families).  See 
also Ghai, supra note 93, at 12 (explaining that “[t]he cohesion of society as well 
as the fulfillment of the individual is secured through a chain and hierarchy of 
duties” in Asian values). 
 112. All Asian nations that convened at the Asian regional preparatory 
meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights signed the 
document.  Ghai, supra note 93, at 6. 
 113. Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World 
Conference on Human Rights, March 29–April 2, 1993, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 (April 7, 1993) [hereinafter Bangkok Declaration]. 
 114. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 91. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 113, at 5. 
 117. Id. at 3. 
 118. Id. at 4.  See also infra Part I.B.3. 
 119. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 113, at 4. 
NG FINAL 6/24/2013  8:02 PM 
282 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:53 
and political independence of States.”120 
The Bangkok Declaration, however, was not the only 
Asian perspective at the meeting.  Dozens of Asian NGOs 
endorsed an alternative view, believing that the agreement 
was just another justification for the perpetuation of abuse in 
their region.121  The NGOs believed that a faulty international 
economic order—collusion amongst international aid 
agencies, political elites, and multinational corporations—
played a role in abusing human rights.122  They also favored 
an equitable distribution of resources and eradication of 
poverty through empowerment of minorities.123  The NGO 
views sound very similar to those of Suu Kyi who stressed: 
The provision of basic material needs is not sufficient to 
make minority groups and indigenous peoples feel they 
are truly part of the greater national entity.  For they 
have to be confident that they too have an active role to 
play in shaping the destiny of the state that demands 
their allegiance.124 
As later discussions of this Comment will show, Suu Kyi 
advocates political integration of the Burmese people and a 
system of legal recourse to ensure legitimacy in the 
government, and stability for the country. 
3. Right to Development 
While many see Asian values as pretext for authoritarian 
control,125 other Asian states have adopted an “economic 
development first” argument to explain their lackluster 
human rights record.126  They argue that democracy has no 
 
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 13–14. 
 122. Id. at 14. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Aung San Suu Kyi, Empowerment for a Culture of Peace and 
Development, Address at the World Commission Culture and Development 7 
(Nov. 21, 1994) (transcript available in the Cornell University Library). 
 125. See infra Part II.B. 
 126. Although the right-to-development argument finds a rationale not 
entirely separate from the Asian values discourse, the rhetorical effect is 
important with respect to various nations.  Singapore may likely emphasize 
Asian values more steadfastly as it has.  While China, with weaker economic 
conditions, may emphasize its right to development.  Political scientist Mark 
Thompson has argued that Germany articulated a similar argument against 
democracy during its imperial history.  See Mark R. Thompson, Whatever 
Happened to “Asian Values?,” 12 J. DEMOCRACY 154, 158 (2001). 
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place in an environment of poverty and thus that economic 
development is the precondition to political rights 
development.127  The theory implies that economic 
development requires a restriction on human rights because 
the government must have a seamless framework to remove 
obstacles.128 
In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Declaration on the Right to Development129 (hereinafter 
“Development Declaration”).  The Development Declaration 
was seen by Western critics as a concession to human rights 
abuses.130  The main force of the declaration emphasized that 
“international co-operation is essential” in assisting 
developing countries.131  The Development Declaration 
vaguely describes the right to development as “an inalienable 
human right.”132  But it is conceptually difficult to understand 
what development really means or how such a right would be 
exercised.133  Constitutional scholar Yash Ghai put it simply, 
“the rich countries must provide economic assistance to the 
poor countries, but must not question their human rights 
situation.”134 
The right-to-development argument implies that the 
secret to economic success lies in an authoritarian political 
system.135  Indeed, many Asian nations did prosper without a 
democratic political structure.136  The role of the state in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan played a key role in their 
 
 127. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 9.  The Chinese argued, “to eat their fill and 
dress warmly were the fundamental demands of the Chinese people who had 
long suffered cold and hunger.”  Id. at 8. 
 128. Id. at 9. 
 129. Declaration on the Right to Development, 97th plenary meeting, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Development Declaration]. 
 130. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 10. 
 131. Development Declaration, supra note 129, at art. 4 § 2. 
 132. Id. at art. 1 § 1. 
 133. “[The] inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth 
and resources” sounds more like the needs of the state, rather than of the 
individual.  Id. at art. 1 § 2. 
 134. Ghai, supra note 93, at 10. 
 135. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 156 (“This view led Singaporean 
senior minister Lee Kuan Yew to warn Manila business leaders that their 
country needed ‘discipline more than democracy.’ ” ). 
 136. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 149 (1999) (noting that 
South Korea, Singapore and postreform China have experienced faster rates of 
economic growth than less authoritarian ones like India, Costa Rica, and 
Jamaica). 
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economies.137  In contrast, Hong Kong’s success can be 
attributed to a mostly unregulated market.  Democracy and 
political freedoms were mostly irrelevant during its 
development stage.138  Ghai raised the important distinction 
that “it was the market which shaped the State in the West, 
but it is the State which has shaped the market in Asia.”139  
Professor Francis Fukuyama, on the other hand, doubted the 
economic efficacy of authoritarian governments and remarked 
“[w]hen such governments function well, as in the case of 
Singapore and South Korea under military rule, they can 
indeed be very effective at promoting rapid growth; but when 
they function badly, like Brazil or Peru during the 1970’s, 
their economies tend to perform much more poorly than 
democracies.”140  Indeed, the Burmese government tried to 
mimic the Indonesian “developmentalist dictatorship” to 
further economic growth.141 
Contrary to some antistate views of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the role of the state is in fact crucial at 
the development stage, as the “East Asian Miracle” 
suggests.142  Caution should be exercised when exposing 
nascent economies to the well-known risks of full-fledged 
capitalism.143  Even Adam Smith recommended a sort of 
“interventionist logic” because the free market and individual 
pursuit of private gains have dire consequences,144 as 
evidenced by the 1997 Asian Crisis.145 
 
 137. See Francis Fukuyama, Asian Values and the Asian Crisis, 105 
COMMENT. MAG. 23, 24 (1998). 
 138. Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law and Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic 
Law, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997, ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 343, 344 
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1993). 
 139. Ghai, supra note 93, at 32. 
 140. Fukuyama, supra note 137, at 24.  See also SEN, supra note 136, at 15 
(“[C]omprehensive intercountry comparisons have not provided any 
confirmation of this thesis, and there is little evidence that authoritarian 
politics actually helps economic growth.”). 
 141. Thompson, supra note 126, at 156. 
 142. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 91 
(2002).  The “East Asian Miracle” is known as the remarkable economic rise of 
particular East Asian states in the last three decades of the twentieth century.  
Id. at 90. 
 143. See SEN, supra note 136, at 124 (“Even Adam Smith . . . did not hesitate 
to investigate economic circumstances in which particular restrictions may be 
sensibly proposed, or economic fields in which nonmarket institutions would be 
badly needed to supplement what the markets can do.”). 
 144. Id. at 124–25. 
 145. See STIGLITZ, supra note 142, at 18. 
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Asian governments have also been the pioneering 
example of promoting human development, the process of 
expanding education, health and other conditions of human 
life.146  Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen notes that the developed 
Asian states established high literacy rates through 
expansion of education and reduced mortality rates through 
health care before seeing a decline in poverty.147  Prime 
Minister Lee stated, “If you have a culture that doesn’t place 
much value in learning and scholarship and hard work and 
thrift and deferment of present enjoyment for future gain, the 
going will be much slower.”148  As Burma continues its path of 
reform, the government must reevaluate the proper role of 
the state—where it should intervene and where it should not. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Asian Values Theory and Its Legitimacy 
Lee Kuan Yew and other Asian leaders,149 by promoting 
communitarianism over individualism, maintained 
authoritarian policies that have resulted in an alarming 
suppression of civil liberties.  In his defense, Lee stated 
emphatically, “It is not my business to tell people what’s 
wrong with their system.  It is my business to tell people not 
to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it 
will not work.”150  In his view, the suppression of civil liberties 
is a necessary condition to Singapore’s stability. 
In support of Lee’s contention, the West had hundreds of 
years to groom democracy and capitalism.  This was done on 
a trial and error basis.151  Along the way, the United States 
 
 146. See SEN, supra note 136, at 41. 
 147. Id. at 150. 
 148. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 116–17. 
 149. See Fukuyama, supra note 137, at 23 (attributing the subject of Asian 
values to Lee Kuan Yew and former Prime Minster Mahathir Mohamad of 
Malaysia); Kishore Mahbubani, The Dangers of Decadence, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 10 
(1993); Thompson, supra note 126, at 155–56, 163 (noting that Indonesia’s 
Suharto was the “leading regional advocate” of “Asian values as a doctrine of 
developmentalism” and that pro-Beijing Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa 
“attempted to use ‘Asian values’ against democracy” upon Hong Kong’s return 
to China in 1997). 
 150. Zakaria, supra note 95, at 110. 
 151. The following are famous American Supreme Court decisions that 
reflect the changing norms in U.S. society: Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954) (holding that the “separate but equal” principle with regard to race 
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and Europe had their own brushes with human rights abuses.  
One must only look to slavery, the treatment of Native 
Americans, colonialism, and women’s rights to see how the 
West has evolved.152  And while such abuses faced opposition 
at the time, those actions were condoned by government 
policy, only to be reversed through a combination of 
democratic vehicles and an eventual shift in popular 
opinion.153  The West’s criticism of human rights abuses is a 
product, at least in part, of norms developed over the 
millennia. 
It is safe to say that a government’s ability to recognize 
community interests and individual interests most likely rest 
on a continuum.154  There may, however, exist a subtle but 
notable distinction between Western individualism and Asian 
group consciousness, at least from a historical standpoint.155  
Pye stated, “it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of 
both individual freedom and society’s needs, and to recognize 
that Westerners are likely to be more sensitive to the first 
issue and Asians to the second.”156  The weight of either 
communitarianism or individualism cannot be measured in 
absolutes.  Perhaps long ago, Asian nations favored 
 
has no place in public education for children); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 223 (1945) (validating the American government’s internment camps 
of Japanese Americans during World War II); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
543 (1896) (holding that the segregation of black and white Americans “do not 
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other”), overruled by 
Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  See also Stephen Breyer, 
“For Their Own Good,” The Cherokees, the Supreme Court and the Early History 
of American Conscience, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/their-own-good. 
 152. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 14 (“There is no reason why contemporary 
concerns and fads in the West should define the parameters of international 
discourse in, and aspirations, of human rights.”). 
 153. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 22 (2010) (In 
responding to a question posed, “[w]hy do Americans do what the courts say?” 
Breyer writes, “[f]ollowing the law is a matter of custom, of habit, of widely 
shared understandings as to how those in government and members of the 
public should, and will, act when faced with a court decision they strongly 
dislike.”). 
 154. See PYE, supra note 9, at 26. 
 155. Id. at 352 n.38 (“The distinction between Western individualism and 
Asian group consciousness has been a dominant theme in Sir George Sansom’s 
interpretation of Japan, John K. Fairbank’s description of China, Louis 
Dumont’s work on India, and the work of such general theorists as Michael 
Polyani, Sir Thomas Maine, and of course both Max Weber and Karl Marx.”). 
 156. Id. at 27. 
NG FINAL 6/24/2013  8:02 PM 
2013 BURMA AND THE ROAD FORWARD 287 
communitarianism, but today a trend toward individualism 
may better serve the needs of the people.157  In writing about 
her own country, Suu Kyi wrote, “[i]t was natural that a 
people who have suffered much from the consequences of bad 
government should be preoccupied with theories of good 
government.”158  It is for this very reason that the former 
Burmese Chairman U Ne Win decided to hold multiparty 
elections in 1990.159 
B. Asian Values Theory and Its Criticism 
Critics have pointed out several flaws with the Asian 
values theory, beginning with its religious scope.160  To 
confine the political governance theory to a single philosophy 
(Confucianism) ignores the diversity of religions and 
philosophies in Asia:161 Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Buddhism in China and Burma, and Christianity in Korea 
and the Philippines.  Even among these religious traditions, 
one can find sources of liberal democracy.  For the purposes of 
this Comment, the discussion will be limited to specific 
Buddhist tenets and how Suu Kyi has relied on them as her 
foundation for Burma’s realization of democracy.162 
From absolute monarchy to socialism, the Burmese have 
always associated their way of life with Buddhism.163  During 
the Burmese monarchy, a king had the duty to rule according 
to moral teachings revealed in the Dhamma.164  The myth of 
Mahasammata described a Hobbesian account of men, “in a 
 
 157. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 21 (“Societies are constantly changing, and 
with economical and social changes, there are also changes in the perception of 
what is important and valuable to a community or a group.”). 
 158. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 168. 
 159. See ZAN, supra note 18, at 251 (writing that Ne Win said, “recent events 
had indicated a lack of confidence in the Government [sic],” and that he needed 
to know whether this view was shared by a “majority or minority”). 
 160. See generally Kim, supra note 110; Ghai, supra note 93, at 7; 
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 139 (“[P]romotion of Buddhism during times of 
political crisis is a long-standing cultural tradition in Burmese politics, dating 
back to the eleventh-century kingdom of Pagan: ‘Where a government has faced 
erosion of political legitimacy, whether it be Anawratha, U Nu, or Ne Win, it 
returns to Buddhism.’ ” ).  Asian NGOs also attacked the Asian values theory at 
the Vienna World Conference on human rights.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 161. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 6. 
 162. Many scholars have pointed to several other religious traditions to 
undermine Lee’s argument.  See generally Kim, supra note 110, at 191–92. 
 163. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 139. 
 164. Id. at 140. 
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state of want,” and their need for a social contract with an 
elected sovereign in exchange for protection.165  Suu Kyi 
disputes suggestions that Buddhist myths about kings 
reinforce personalized forms of authority that are antithetical 
to the modern state, writing that “because Mahasammata 
was chosen by popular consent and required to govern in 
accordance with just laws, the concept of government elective 
and sub lege is not alien to traditional Burmese thought.”166 
Burmese kings were morally bound to abide by ten moral 
precepts (also known as the Ten Duties): “almsgiving, 
observance of Buddhist precepts, liberality, rectitude, 
gentleness, self-restriction, control of anger, avoidance of the 
use of violence in his relationship with the people or 
avoidance of maltreatment of the people, forbearance, and 
‘non-opposition’ against the people’s will.”167  Suu Kyi 
frequently references the last precept to reinforce her belief in 
Burma’s democratic potential.  “The real duty of non-
opposition is a reminder that the legitimacy of government is 
founded on the consent of the people, who may withdraw 
their mandate at any time if they lose confidence in the 
ability of the ruler to serve their best interests.”168 
Aside from religious limitations, critics also find the 
Asian values rhetoric both self-serving and hypocritical.  
Authoritarian leaders have crushed whole communities in the 
name of “state stability:”169 China and the Tibetans;170 Burma 
and the Karen, Kachin, Shan, and Rohingya communities;171 
and Indonesia and the communists.172  Though its actions 
have not been as wide scale as its neighbors, Singapore has 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 170. 
 167. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 142. 
 168. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 173. 
 169. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 17 (“Governments have destroyed many 
communities in the name of development or State stability, and the consistent 
refusal of most of them to recognise that there are indigenous peoples among 
their population . . . is but a demonstration of their lack of commitment to the 
real community.”). 
 170. Edward Wong, Study Points to Heavy-Handed Repression of Tibetan 
Area in China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/13/world/asia/study-points-to-heavy-handed-repression-of-tibetan-area-
in-china.html?ref=edwardwong&_r=0. 
 171. See Naing, supra note 91; see supra text accompanying note 92. 
 172. Marilyn Berger, Suharto Dies at 86, Indonesian Dictator Brought Order 
and Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
01/28/world/asia/28suharto.html?pagewanted=all. 
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reportedly taped and doctored confessions extracted from 
activists under coercion and presented those confessions to 
national television as proof of guilt.173  Often falsely equating 
the “community” with the “state,”174 autocratic regimes have 
claimed that they directly advance national stability by 
preventing secession and disunity.175  Burma thus repealed 
the right to secession from its 1947 Constitution176 and the 
2008 Constitution expressly prohibits such a right.177 
Another criticism leveled against the Asian values theory 
is that its characterization of “excessive individualism” in the 
West is overbroad.  The United States does provide expansive 
individual rights in areas ranging from speech to gun 
ownership, especially when compared to its Asian 
counterparts, but those rights are not absolute.  For example, 
the right to free speech is evidence against Lee’s 
characterization of the West.  Americans do not enjoy 
protection when their expression involves obscenity, fighting 
words, or incitement to violence.178  Furthermore, individual 
states can prescribe their own standards for regulating 
libel.179  Child pornography, though it can be viewed as 
individual expression, is categorically unprotected.180  
 
 173. Ghai, supra note 93, at 9. 
 174. Id. at 17. 
 175. Regarding its preventive detention of activists, Singapore’s Minister of 
Home Affairs responded, “[i]n our short history, Singapore has repeatedly 
encountered subversive threats from within and without. . . . To combat these 
threats to the nation, the usual procedures of court trials . . . have proved totally 
inadequate. . . . Preventive detention is not a blemish marring our record; it is a 
necessary power underpinning our freedom.”  Id. at 9. 
 176. See 1947 CONST., supra note 37, at ch. 10, § 201 (“[E]very State shall 
have the right to secede from the Union in accordance with the conditions 
hereinafter prescribed.”). 
 177. MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 1, § 10 (“No part of the territory 
constituted in the Union such as Regions, States, Union Territories and Self-
Administered Areas shall ever secede from the Union.”). 
 178. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining the standards of 
what constitutes obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
(distinguishing between mere advocacy and advocacy that “is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action,” the latter being constitutionally unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that “fighting words” are “those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace”). 
 179. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974). 
 180. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“[T]he distribution 
network for pornography must be closed if the production of material which 
requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.”). 
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Similarly, an individual’s expression through public nudity 
has also been invalidated.181  Moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court has routinely validated the government’s 
regulation of an individual’s free speech rights on public 
grounds under “time, place and manner” restrictions.182  Lee’s 
description of the Western individual’s right to “unbecoming 
behavior” in the public space is far from the truth.183  By 
ignoring the actual state of rights throughout the world, the 
cultural arguments of Asian values have conveniently served 
to suppress opposition in countries like Burma.184 
C. Rights vs. Duties 
While many have addressed the defensive tone of Asian 
values, there may nonetheless be some subtle merit in the 
distinction between the Western emphasis of rights and the 
Asian notion of duties.  In the West, the evolution of rights 
correlated strongly with the evolution of the market 
economy.185  Duties, on the other hand, may be a product of 
Asian socialization, a nuanced norm dictated by the Asian 
 
 181. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (holding that the 
prohibition of public nudity in public places targets secondary effects of the 
conduct such as public health, safety and welfare). 
 182. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
(ruling that the prohibition against sleeping overnight, even as a form of 
protest, in a designated park area was not unconstitutional); Members of the 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 795 (1984) (ruling that the 
prohibition of hanging signs over certain public property is a “reasonable 
regulation affecting the time, place, and manner of expression” because it 
protects utility workers and eliminates traffic hazards). 
 183. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 184. Other American constitutional rights also carry restrictions.  The right 
to bear arms does not mean that an individual can carry a handgun for any 
purpose.  See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).  
Additionally, an individual cannot practice her religion if her practice runs 
contrary to other laws.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 878–79 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate.”).  With respect to criminal procedure, an 
individual can avail herself of Fourth Amendment protection against a 
warrantless search only if she can demonstrate 1) that she has an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) that society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27–28 
(2001) (applying Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967)). 
 185. Ghai has provided both a logical and historical connection between 
democracy and the market, and both connections explain the foundation of 
rights in Western society.  See Ghai, supra note 93, at 31. 
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emphasis on hierarchy and chain of command.186 
From both a historical and logical standpoint, the West’s 
emphasis on individual rights is inherent in the market 
economy and its evolution.  Private property ownership 
necessitates decentralization and individual decision making 
through freedom of choice.187  Judicially cognizable rights 
ensure predictability and legal security of such autonomous 
decisions.188  Similarly, the departure from traditional forms 
of economic tools such as labor (from “status” to “contract”) 
required the utility of rights and democratic vehicles.189  Sen 
stated, “conceptualization of economic needs depends 
crucially on open public debates and discussions, the 
guaranteeing of which requires insistence on basic political 
liberty and civil rights.”190  The United States’ Occupy 
movement is an example of the democratic response to 
capitalist forces.191 
In Asia, however, it is believed that individual duties 
have a higher priority.  While it is not clear what the precise 
duties are and where they come from, it is at least clear from 
Lee’s criticism of American excess that such duties are 
related to personal responsibility.192  If Lee argued correctly 
that the “liberal, intellectual tradition” heedlessly views that 
“everybody would be better off if they were allowed to do their 
own thing,”193 then self-restraint is a better fit in the Asian 
tradition.  It could be that duty is intrinsically tied to the 
“Asian orientation toward the group . . . [that] elevates tests 
of loyalty and commitment . . . while downplaying the 
legitimacy of using politics to advance special interests.”194  To 
understand Asian values against the Western liberal, 
intellectual tradition, the notion of rights is necessarily 
individual centric and the notion of duties is necessarily 
community centric. 
 
 
 186. Id. at 12. 
 187. See id. at 31. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. SEN, supra note 136, at 148. 
 191. Chrystia Freeland, Inequality, but Without the Villains, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/us/09iht-letter09.html. 
 192. See Zakaria, supra note 95, at 112. 
 193. Id. 
 194. PYE, supra note 9, at 27. 
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It must necessarily follow that the notion of duties must 
also be extended to the state.  Like Suu Kyi, who has stressed 
the kingly duty to rule by the consent of the people, Ghai has 
also noted that “the notion of duty can be truly 
revolutionary.”195  Furthermore, Pye pointed out that the 
concept of paternalism does not have the stigma in Asia as it 
does in the West.196  “In most Asian cultures leaders are 
expected to be nurturing, benevolent, kind, sympathetic 
figures who inspire commitment and dedication.”197 
While there is no clear answer to the priority of rights or 
duties, it is at least clear that in repressive regimes like 
Burma, there is both a deprivation of rights on the one hand, 
and a neglect of government duty on the other.198  Ghai 
cautioned that in practice, however, the notion of duties 
creates social, economic, and political subordination,199 
particularly in the hands of an intolerant government.  “The 
West has, to some extent, separated civil society from the 
State, creating a ‘neutral’ public area and space for 
communities”200 where individuals can exercise their political 
rights.  In Asia, the tendency has been towards a 
“convergence of the two, regarded perhaps as necessary for 
the legitimacy of the State but ultimately destructive of the 
community.”201 
D. Feasibility of the Right-to-Development Argument 
From an economic historical perspective, the West and 
the East share similar paths.  Like many Asian nations 
during their developmental periods,202 the United States and 
Japan engaged in similar protectionist economic strategies 
during the beginning days of capitalist development.203  It was 
 
 195. Ghai, supra note 93, at 19. 
 196. PYE, supra note 9, at 27. 
 197. Id. at 27–28. 
 198. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 176 (“Democracy acknowledges the right to 
differ as well as the duty to settle differences peacefully.”). 
 199. Ghai, supra note 93, at 19. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. (citation omitted). 
 202. See STIGLITZ, supra note 142, at 91 (remarking that the East Asian 
Miracle became successful because they had not followed the dictates of the 
Washington Consensus that demanded “minimalist roles” of the government). 
 203. See id. at 16 (“[M]ost of the advanced industrialist countries—including 
the United States and Japan—had built up their economies by wisely and 
selectively protecting some of their industries until they were strong enough to 
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not until the United States reached the pinnacle of its 
economic prosperity during post–World War II that the 
American government was finally responding to the 
disenfranchisement of millions of African-Americans at home.  
Was the United States exercising its right to development?  I 
would respond with a resounding “no.”  Instead, it is more 
likely that economic modernization and democracy develop 
along a continuum, overlapping sometimes as a country 
responds to various social and historical forces.  Neither 
needs to be a precondition of the other. 
The sequencing of economic and political rights is indeed 
problematic.  Sen has urged the recognition of 
“interconnections [that exist] between political freedoms and 
the understanding and fulfillment of economic needs.”204  A 
society requires a democratic framework first before they can 
decide basic needs.205  While some Asian states have achieved 
economic success without democracy, there is no reason to 
believe that a country needs to restrict political freedoms in 
order to achieve economic modernity.206  The democratic 
movements in South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan serve to counter certain governments’ shortsighted 
belief that their people care more about economic livelihood 
than political participation.207  Burma clearly saw the 
symbiotic relationship between economic development and 
political rights in 2007 when Buddhist monks took to the 
streets after a drastic rise in fuel prices.208 
III. BURMA’S NEW FUTURE 
While Burma has undergone reforms at an 
unprecedented rate, the country faces a long journey ahead 
before it can achieve any recognizable form of democracy.  
Whether Burma can politically reform to achieve a level of 
confidence, sustainability, and international recognition is 
the million-dollar question.  Burma’s potential for success can 
be predicted by the histories of its Asian neighbors—what has 
worked and what has not worked.  Suu Kyi’s influential role 
 
compete with foreign companies.”). 
 204. SEN, supra note 136, at 147. 
 205. Ghai, supra note 93, at 30. 
 206. See SEN, supra note 136, at 150. 
 207. Id. at 151. 
 208. See Arendshorst, supra note 51, at 104. 
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in Burmese politics may precipitate the movement and usher 
in a new era for one of Asia’s most troubled nations. 
A. Constitution of 2008 
The tug-of-war between rights and duties is apparent in 
the 2008 Constitution.  With respect to individual rights, 
Burma’s latest constitution remains suspiciously vague.  
Chapter eight, entitled “Citizen, Fundamental Rights and 
Duties of the Citizens,” codifies both an equal protection and 
a due process clause.209  However, both of these fundamental 
rights are subject to suspension upon a state of emergency.210  
Moreover, while the constitution provides the right to practice 
political liberties such as free exercise of religion, free speech, 
and right to association, these rights cannot be exercised 
“contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence 
of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public 
order and morality.”211  An individual also has the duty to 
preserve community peace.212  “Necessary law” shall be 
enacted to effectuate “citizens’ freedoms, rights, benefits, 
responsibility and restrictions . . . .”213  This last provision is 
strikingly similar to the Asian values argument that stresses 
community stability at the expense of individual rights.  The 
relaxation or even elimination of the present restrictions 
against these individual rights must occur in order to 
transition Burma into a new state. 
Considering Burma’s history, the most troubling aspect 
of the 2008 Constitution is the role of the military.  The 
military, acting on any perceived threat to national security, 
can independently reverse the new reforms.  As stated in the 
preamble, the country’s principle objectives are defensive in 
nature, specifically “non-disintegration of the Union,” 
 
 209. Burma’s equal protection clause states, “The Union shall guarantee any 
person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal 
protection.”  MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 8, § 347.  The due process 
clause states, “Except in the following situations and time, no citizen shall be 
denied redress by due process of law for grievances entitled under law: (a) in 
time of foreign invasion; (b) in time of insurrection; (c) in time of emergency.”  
Id. at ch. 8, § 381. 
 210. Id. at ch. 8, § 420, ch. 11, § 414(b). 
 211. Id. at ch. 8, § 354. 
 212. Id. at ch. 1, § 21(c) (“Every citizen is responsible for public peace and 
tranquility and prevalence of law and order.”). 
 213. Id. at ch. 1, § 21(d). 
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“[n]ational solidarity,” and “perpetuation of sovereignty.”214  
The military is “mainly responsible” for maintaining these 
objectives,215 and thus responsible for upholding the 
constitution. 
Not only does it have express authority from the 
constitution to act, the military is also guaranteed seats in 
both the national216 and local legislatures.217  A state of 
emergency allows the military to assume all legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers.218  Any amendment affecting 
individual rights or the organization of the government 
requires an initial approval of seventy-five percent of the 
national legislature.219  Because the military dominates so 
many seats, it would be impossible to obtain constitutional 
muster without at least minimal military support. 
While it is not likely to happen soon, a constitutional 
amendment in Burma is possible.  Although military 
entrenchment in Burma’s constitutional procedure is 
undeniable, it is possible that Burma’s military generals are 
in agreement with the current movement for change.  The old 
military guard is no longer in power, and the current generals 
are all much younger men.220  Suu Kyi has indicated that she 
finds President Thein Sein, a former military general, to be 
“an honest man . . . a man capable of taking risks if he thinks 
they are worth taking.”221  The power transitions in the 
military appear to favor the potential for real change in 
 
 214. Id. at Preamble. 
 215. Id. at ch. 1, § 20(e). 
 216. In Burma’s bicameral legislature, the military is guaranteed 110 seats 
in the Pyithu Hluttaw, an assembly similar to the American Congress whose 
members are based on population.  Id. at ch. 4, § 109.  The Amyotha Hluttaw, 
similar to the American Senate based on equal representation from the 
Burmese states and regions, reserves fifty-six seats for the military.  Id. at ch. 4, 
§ 141. 
 217. The military is guaranteed an equal number of seats as one-third of the 
non-military representatives of the region and state legislatures.  Id. at ch. 4,  
§ 161(d).  Burma is comprised of seven states, seven regions, and territories 
called the “Union territories.” MYAN. CONST., supra note 1, at ch. 2, § 49. 
 218. Id. at ch. 11, §§ 413(b), 419. 
 219. Id. at ch. 12, § 436(a). 
 220. Nirupama Subramanian, Towards Reconciliation in Myanmar, THE 
HINDU (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/ 
article2592036.ece (calling the military generals “junior partners in 
government” today). 
 221. Jason Burke, Aung San Suu Kyi’s Party Could Rule Burma One Day, 
Says Presidential Aide, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Jan. 5, 2012, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/aung-san-suu-kyi-burma. 
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Burma. 
B. Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Future Civil Society 
The development of civil society, which is at a historical 
low in Burma,222 is necessary to provide lasting change.  As 
the Burmese government begins to loosen up restrictions on 
political liberties, it is inevitable that the people will seize the 
opportunity to put forth their grievances.  Indeed, since the 
1990 election, interest groups began appearing throughout 
the Burmese political scene, some of which championed 
alternative constitutions.223  While ethnic violence persists, 
the government recently established a cease-fire agreement 
with the Shan state, a major ethnic minority.224  The Burmese 
people are more optimistic about the civilian government, 
marveling at their ability to speak openly about their political 
views.225 
Suu Kyi remains the beacon of hope for so many 
Burmese.  The Burmese government would do well to 
seriously consider her ideas.  Her involvement with the 
government and the reform process is extremely visible.  The 
positions Suu Kyi has taken in the last twenty years may 
provide hints as to how she plans on influencing the current 
government.  First and foremost, Suu Kyi has been a 
vociferous critic of the cultural argument advanced by Lee 
and his supporters, and has directly addressed the arguments 
made in this Comment.226  She accuses authoritarian 
governments of wrongly considering themselves better suited 
to enjoy more rights and privileges than the governments of 
democratic countries.  This, Suu Kyi argues, leads the 
authoritarian government to assume “so wide a gulf between 
the government and the people that they have to be judged by 
 
 222. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 198. 
 223. See Williams, supra note 34, at 1673. 
 224. Agence France-Presse, Burma Reaches Ceasefire with Major Rebel 
Group, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2011, 11: 21 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-
12-03/burma-ceasefire-with-major-rebel-group/3711274. 
 225. Myo Thein & Dean Nelson, Burmese Dare to Believe Dash to Democracy 
Will Set Them Free, THE VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Burmese+dare+believe+dash+democracy+
will+them+free/5555477/story.html. 
 226. See Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 2 (“In the light of such arguments 
culture and development need to be carefully examined and defined that they 
may not be used, or rather, misused to block the aspirations of peoples for 
democratic institutions and human rights.”). 
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different norms.”227 
Second, Suu Kyi has challenged the right-to-development 
argument.  She believes that the key to unlocking human 
potential cannot be limited to economic concerns; such 
concerns are necessarily related to different value systems 
understood by the privileged and unprivileged. 
The differing views ultimately reflect differences in how 
the valuation of the various components of social and national 
unity are made; how such basic concepts as poverty, progress, 
culture, freedom, democracy, and human rights are defined 
and, of crucial importance, who has the power to determine 
such values and definitions.228 
For a poor person, the alleviation of her status is not 
simply to make more money, but to also be involved in the 
decision-making process that allows her to shape her present 
and future destiny in her country.229  For Suu Kyi, the 
sequencing of economic rights and political rights is simply 
not acceptable. 
Third, Suu Kyi has always supported Western sanctions 
against her country,230 suggesting that the Burmese need 
more than just an economic solution.231  She has said, “It is 
assumed that economic measures can resolve all the problems 
facing their countries.”232  Historian Thant Myint-U ardently 
disagrees, believing that the sanctions have been extremely 
counterproductive to the democratic movement, slowing “the 
emergence of the sort of independent middle class on which 
any sustainable democratic transition will depend.”233  The 
problem with receiving aid conditioned on human rights is 
 
 227. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 175. 
 228. Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 3. 
 229. Id. at 3–4.  This view goes against a position that Pye has taken when 
comparing the American and Asian notions of power: “In most of Asia . . . to 
have power was to be spared the chore of decision-making . . . Making decisions 
means taking risks, while security lies in having no choices to make.”  PYE, 
supra note 9, at 21–22. 
 230. Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for Sanctions on Burma to Remain, THE 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news 
/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8310214/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-calls-forsanctions-
on-Burma-to-remain.html. 
 231. See Suu Kyi, supra note 124, at 3 (“[T]he Market Economy, not merely 
adorned with capital letters but seen in an almost mystic haze, is increasingly 
regarded by many governments as the quick and certain way to material 
prosperity.”). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See Subramanian, supra note 220. 
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that there is no universal standard.234  This confrontation 
between national sovereignty and the international 
community leaves millions in the dark.  It is the absence of 
Western aid in Burma, as well as a looming Chinese 
influence, that some believe is the motivation for reform.235 
Lastly, Suu Kyi is devoted to transitioning Burma into a 
liberal democracy.  Long ago she wrote, “[a]t its most basic 
and intermediate level, liberal democracy would mean in 
institutional terms a representative government appointed 
for a constitutionally limited term through free and fair 
elections.”236  While Westerners may take democratic 
institutions for granted, for a country like Burma that has 
been historically blemished by brutality, “democracy, like 
liberty, justice and other social and political rights, is not 
‘given,’ it is earned through courage, resolution and 
sacrifice.”237  Suu Kyi has also advocated a federalist 
structure for increased sovereignty and protection of ethnic-
dominated states.238  Recently tasked with establishing a rule 
of law in Burma,239 Suu Kyi has a long road ahead to revamp 
Burmese society, but fortunately has a wealth of ideas ready 
for her people that she has long yearned to share. 
CONCLUSION 
Is Aung San Suu Kyi too idealistic and Singapore’s Lee 
Kuan Yew too pragmatic?  Historian Myint Zan reminisced a 
remark by one of his students who said, “Aung San Suu Kyi is 
idealistic, she has never been in political power.  Lee Kuan 
 
 234. See Ghai, supra note 93, at 25.  Ghai wrote:  
[p]overty is a great cause of the denial of human rights.  The 
international system refuses to accept this reality—for largely political 
reasons.  It refuses to acknowledge that poverty destroys human 
dignity; and without human dignity there can be no human rights; or 
indeed the capacity to challenge the system of oppression. 
Id. at 23.  Certainly Suu Kyi would agree with this statement, but it is unclear 
whether the two would reach the same agreement on the issue of Western 
sanctions against Burma. 
 235. See Bertil Lintner, China Behind Myanmar’s Course Shift, ASIA TIMES 
ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ 
Asia/MJ19Ae03.html. 
 236. SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 169. 
 237. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
 238. Ba Kaung, Suu Kyi Asks for Federalism Theses, THE IRRAWADDY (Thai.) 
(May 12, 2011), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21287. 
 239. See Associated Press, supra note 83. 
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Yew is a seasoned politician.  I would take Lee any time over 
Aung San Suu Kyi.”240  Perhaps the answer is not so clear cut.  
While Lee’s pragmatism certainly cannot be denied 
considering the rapid prosperity he brought to his country, 
Singapore embarked on a different path following its 
independence241 from Britain.242  Burma’s path was mired by 
isolationism and repression.  It is because of this experience 
that Suu Kyi believes democracy “is not given” but must be 
“earned.”243  When faced with Lee’s communitarian approach 
and the West’s individualism, Suu Kyi may very well 
advocate a “Middle Way,” a Buddhist approach to avoid both 
extremes.244  The various paths of its Asian neighbors will be 
an invaluable source for Burma in the coming years.  
Avoiding the failures and learning the successes of the past 
will aid Burma, as it desires to move forward to achieve a 
lasting democracy. 
 
 240. Zan, supra note 107, at 66. 
 241. Technically, Singapore seceded from Malaysia.  U.S. Cent. Intelligence 
Agency, East & Southeast Asia: Singapore, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html. (last 
updated Oct. 16, 2012). 
 242. Inquiring what was the difference between the Malaysian and Burmese 
path from independence, Myint Zan wrote, “ ‘history [has] been less kind’ to 
Burma than, say Malaysia and other countries which at least compared to 
Burma has accountable representative governments[.]”  ZAN, supra note 18, at 
225. 
 243. See SUU KYI, supra note 7, at 176. 
 244. Zan, supra note 107, at 63. 
